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This article examines recent developments concerning employee and trade union 
rights to collective negotiations with employers. It considers the extent to which 
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association is protected by the present 
legal framework. Ireland’s “voluntarist” system of industrial relations is considered 
in the light of the enactment of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Acts 2001–
2004, and the recent interpretation of the legislation in the case of Ryanair v The 
Labour Court [2007] I.E.S.C. 6. The article also looks at the future role of the 
Labour Court, the State’s main industrial relations tribunal and a key plank of the 
voluntarist system.   
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Introduction 
Ireland has traditionally maintained a “voluntarist” system of industrial relations 
under which the industrial relations actors (employers and trade unions) conduct 
their relationship, by and large, in the absence of legally imposed structures. 
While Art.40.6.1.iii.of the Irish Constitution protects the right of freedom of 
association, unlike many other Western democracies, trade unions in Ireland 
have no right to be recognised for bargaining purposes by an employer. Thus, 
while employees are free to join a trade union, they cannot insist their employer 
negotiate with that union regarding their pay and conditions. Employees and 
trade unions have traditionally gained the right to negotiate collectively with 
employers through the use, or threat, of collective action. This, of course, 
depends to a large extent on trade unions mobilising a “critical mass” of 
employees to join, and to participate, in trade union action. In the context of 
declining trade union density in the 1980s and 1990s, the issue of statutory 
recognition rights for trade unions became a key point of discussion during social 
partnership talks. Under the fourth social partnership agreement, Partnership 
2000, a high level group comprising trade union and employer representatives 
was set up to examine the issue. 
 
What emerged from the partnership process were the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Acts 2001–2004 (hereinafter “the Acts”). Under the Acts, an 
employer may be compelled to grant union representatives the right to represent 
unionised employees on workplace issues relating to pay, and terms and 
conditions of employment. The Labour Court can make a determination with 
regard to these matters, and to dispute resolution and disciplinary procedures, in 
the employment concerned. However, the Acts explicitly rule out granting trade 
union recognition rights; s.5(2) of the 2001 Act provides that the Labour Court 
cannot provide for arrangements for collective bargaining. (For a fuller outline of 
the legislation see Ryan, “Leaving it to the Experts-In the Matter of the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Act 2001” (2006) 3 (4) I.E.L.J. 118.). The Labour Court 
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has a key role under the Acts in investigating disputes, making recommendations 
and, if necessary, making binding determinations.  
 
This article looks at the degree to which the legislative framework in place 
adequately protects the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association 
contained in Art.40.6.1.iii (and under European and International law), particularly 
in relation to employee rights to collective negotiation of pay and working 
conditions. It also considers the future role of the Labour Court in relation to 
protecting collective negotiating rights. Both of these issues have recently been 
thrown into sharp focus by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ryanair v The 
Labour Court [2007] I.E.S.C. 6.  
 
The Ryanair case centred on a dispute between a number of pilots, members of 
the Irish Airline Pilots Association (IALPA, a branch of the Irish Municipal Public 
and Civil Trade Union, IMPACT), who sought to have the union negotiate with 
Ryanair about various issues on their behalf. Ryanair refused to negotiate with 
the union and, as a result, the union invoked the procedures under the Acts. 
When both the Labour Court and the High Court found against it, Ryanair 
appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision (see Turner, 
“Cases and Comment: Ryanair v The Labour Court and Irish Municipal Public 
and Civil Trade Union (IMPACT)” (2007) 4 (1) I.E.L.J. 24) is extremely significant 
in its treatment of the two key issues discussed above. I will look at, in turn, the 
future role of the Labour Court, and the current state of play in respect of the 
collective representation rights of Irish employees.  
 
(Don’t) leave it to the experts? 
A central plank of Ryanair’s complaint to the Supreme Court was that the Labour 
Court hearing of the company’s case had been fundamentally unfair. In 
particular, the company complained that, while two of its senior officers had given 
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oral evidence at the hearing, no employee gave evidence and, indeed, none of 
the pilots involved was at any stage identified. 
 
At several points in his judgment Geoghegan J. referred to the informal 
procedures adopted by the Labour Court (for example, the fact that no sworn 
evidence of any kind had been taken). In particular, the fact that neither a single 
pilot nor any other employee of Ryanair was called by the union to give evidence 
to the Labour Court meant, given the particular issues at stake in the case, that it 
was not open to the Labour Court to reach the conclusions which it did reach in 
the absence of such oral evidence.  
 
The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court did not adopt fair procedures, 
firstly, by permitting complete non-disclosure of the identity of the persons on 
whose behalf the union was purporting to be acting and, secondly, by 
disbelieving the oral evidence of two senior management figures in Ryanair (who 
maintained at all stages that appropriate bargaining procedures were in place, 
see below) in the absence of hearing evidence from at least one relevant pilot 
who was an employee of Ryanair. The Labour Court had decided the issue 
against Ryanair to a large extent on foot of omissions in Ryanair documentation 
and on foot of a view put forward by the union that the company did not engage 
in collective bargaining; this, according to the Supreme Court, did not amount to 
sufficient evidence to justify the finding. 
 
This aspect of the Supreme Court’s judgment is surprising, as the Superior 
Courts have traditionally been quite deferential to the Labour Court’s expertise 
with regard to industrial relations issues. A recent strong vindication of the latter’s 
role was seen in the judgment in Ashford Castle v SIPTU [2006] I.E.H.C. 201, 
where Clarke J. noted that the Labour Court was an administrative body which 
was required, when exercising its role under industrial relations legislation, to 
bring to bear its own expert view on the approach to take to the issues. He held 
that “a very high degree of deference indeed needs to be applied to decisions 
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which involve the exercise by a statutory body, such as the Labour Court, of an 
expertise which this Court does not have”. This echoed a view expressed by 
Butler J. in a case involving workers in Jury’s Hotel Group that “industrial 
relations cannot be resolved in a court of law” (Sheehan, “Judge Quotes Larkin, 
Says IR Dispute Not For Courts” (2006) Industrial Relations News 29, p.24).  
Indeed, in the Ryanair case itself Hanna J. in the High Court ([2006] I.E.H.C. 
118) had also endorsed this view. He was satisfied that the Labour Court did 
have material before it, which enabled it to come to the conclusion reached: 
 
“The Labour Court is very much in charge of its own procedures. It has 
provided over many years a vital and invaluable service to the State in the 
often fraught area of industrial relations. It is not a court of law and the 
practice and procedure which it has evolved over the years, 
understandably, necessarily involved pursuing a less ritualistic and 
formalistic path than might be the case before these courts.” 
 
In fact, as Hanna J. pointed out, the present case was somewhat noteworthy in 
that lawyers, who rarely attend sittings of the Labour Court, did attend on behalf 
of the applicant in this case. The Supreme Court laid great stress on the failure of 
the Labour Court to hear oral evidence from any of the pilots involved in the 
dispute. On that issue, Hanna J. noted that the bulk of the documentation to 
which the Labour Court referred in its decision emanated not from some “absent 
third party” but from Ryanair itself. Its authenticity, therefore, could not be 
challenged. He went on to point out that whether or not oral evidence is offered in 
a case is a call made on a daily basis before courts by advocates, and that in a 
more formal setting parties are free to offer viva voce evidence, or not, as the 
case may be. He went on to observe that, while there might be circumstances in 
which the Labour Court might take a more “activist role” in determining what oral 
evidence it might wish to hear (for example, where there is a marked imbalance 
of "fire power" in the representation of the parties before it), this was not such a 
case.  
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The Supreme Court’s criticism of the procedures adopted by the Labour Court 
will likely have the effect of encouraging a greater formality in respect of Labour 
Court hearings and perhaps encourage a further “juridificiation” of the process 
(Browne, The Juridification of the Employment Relationship (Avebury, Aldershot, 
1994)). The Labour Court has already drawn up a list of the key issues that arise 
out of the judgment and has laid down a set of guidelines that it will follow in 
future hearings (Sheehan, “Labour Court’s Guidelines for 2001-2004 Cases in 
Wake of ‘Ryanair’ Judgment” (2007) Industrial Relations News 14, p.1). The 
guidelines state that where there is a question over whether the union represents 
employees of the employer, this will have to be resolved on evidence, usually 
requiring the disclosure of the identity of at least one of its members who are 
party to the dispute. Factual issues, which are in dispute, are to be resolved on 
oral evidence from parties who can give first hand evidence. In general, the 
Labour Court will need to apply the best evidence rule. This requires that the 
primary source of information relied upon should be available to the Court, and 
that direct evidence on any issue is generally preferred to a legal submission, an 
opinion or references to documents unsupported by direct evidence.  
 
The result of all this will most likely be more lawyers, more delays and more 
costs. Already the Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation (IBEC) has 
called for the procedures relating to the Acts to be revised, as it believes the time 
frames under which cases are to be processed are now too tight, given that a 
greater level of procedural and evidential formality will need to be introduced into 
Labour Court hearings. The union movement may find it difficult to take on the 
legal firepower of some employers on these terms, and members may be 
frustrated by the longer time it will take to process claims. In addition, the fact 
that employees may now be compelled to give evidence in such cases also 
means that many are likely to be discouraged from pursuing claims under the 
legislation, particularly if their employer displays a Ryanair-like aversion to trade 
unions. There are separate anti-victimisation procedures in existence under the 
Acts (ss.8 and 9 of the 2004 Act), which have rarely been used. If unions have to 
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reveal their members to take a case, these provisions may become more 
important. 
 
A further ramification of the Supreme Court’s finding in Ryanair might well be the 
extension of higher evidential standards into other cases heard in the Labour 
Court (individual employment rights cases, for example). Again, this could make 
Labour Court hearings more legalistic and more akin to ordinary civil court 
actions. The Supreme Court declined to lay down precise criteria for the Labour 
Court to follow in its hearings, which may result in further challenges to Labour 
Court decisions even after new standards have been introduced. It may be the 
case that legislative intervention is required here.  
 
One of the most controversial, and potentially far-reaching, aspects of the 
Supreme Court decision was its criticism of what it referred to as the Labour 
Court’s “mindset”, which favoured the way particular expressions are used and 
particular activities are carried out by trade unions. Noting that the purpose of the 
legislation was to avoid the danger that, in a non-unionised company, employees 
may be exploited and may have to submit to unfair terms and conditions of 
employment, Geoghegan J. at several points of his judgment seemed concerned 
that the legislation was being used to encroach on Ryanair’s right to operate a 
non-unionised company. Most explicitly, he referred, with disapproval, to a view 
hinted at by the Labour Court that collective bargaining in a non-unionised 
company must take the same form and adopt the same procedures as would 
apply in collective bargaining with a trade union. This has been a common 
criticism of the approach of the Labour Court to the 2001 and 2004 Acts; that its 
expansive rulings seek to impose “union conditions” on non-union companies 
(Doherty, “Ryanair Ruling Serious for Labour Court Role”, Irish Times, February 
2, 2007). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s comments can be seen as further 
evidence of a move away from the courts’ traditional deferential approach to the 
State’s main industrial relations tribunal.  
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The interpretation of the legislation 
The interpretation given to the right to bargain legislation by the Supreme Court 
in Ryanair will have highly significant implications for Irish industrial relations 
practice, as well as for the rights of employees to negotiate collectively with 
employers. As the Supreme Court pointed out, the legislative regime in question 
was enacted in order to prevent unfair dealings on the part of an employer with 
employees in non-unionised companies. The legislation provides that employees 
in such a situation may have ultimate recourse to the Labour Court, where there 
are not in place reasonable arrangements for resolving problems with the 
employer on a collective basis. Before going on to analyse the position that now 
pertains in relation to collective representation in Irish law, I will first outline how 
the Supreme Court, in their construction of the right to bargain legislation, 
diverged from the Labour Court in three key areas.   
 
Practice 
The first relates to s.2(1) of the 2004 Act whereby, in order to exercise 
jurisdiction, the Labour Court must be satisfied that it is “not the practice of the 
employer to engage in collective bargaining negotiations in respect of the 
relevant grade, group or category of workers who are parties to the trade 
dispute”. Ryanair outlined the system that the company contended amounted to 
“collective bargaining”. Employees, including pilots, elect employee 
representatives to Employee Representative Committees (ERCs). The various 
ERCs then negotiate directly with the company on an ongoing basis in relation to 
all terms and conditions of employment. It was accepted that the Dublin pilot 
representatives had withdrawn from the ERC in August 2004 and no new 
representatives had been appointed. This withdrawal gave rise to a discussion by 
the court of what was meant by “practice” in this context. The view accepted by 
the Labour Court was that if a group of employees unilaterally withdraws from the 
internal negotiating procedures, it could not thereafter be said that the employer 
had a practice of engaging in collective bargaining with them. The Supreme 
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Court found that this was a mistaken interpretation of the Court’s decision in 
Iarnród Éireann v Holbrooke [2001] 1 I.R. 237. The literal interpretation, given the 
words by the Labour Court, would have the effect of allowing a category of 
employee (like the Dublin pilots) to invoke the Labour Court simply by deciding to 
boycott whatever collective bargaining machinery the company had put in place. 
That, the Court found, would be a serious infringement of the right of an 
employer to maintain its own internal negotiating machinery. The Supreme Court 
was sympathetic to the company’s argument that, in so far as negotiations with 
the Dublin pilots were not, in reality, taking place, this was only because the pilot 
representatives had themselves withdrawn. 
 
The Supreme Court interpreted the provision as requiring a decision on whether 
or not there was in place any permanent machinery for collective bargaining 
negotiations, which would have obliged the management of Ryanair to sit around 
the table with representatives of the Dublin pilots and discuss matters of pay and 
conditions. Such machinery would need to have been established, in place and 
not ad hoc. Once that requirement was fulfilled the fact that the category of 
employees may not have availed of such machinery was irrelevant. This was a 
fact-finding exercise that the Labour Court had failed to carry out correctly (due 
largely to the procedural and evidential failings outlined above).  
  
The Labour Court should have been addressing its mind to whether there were in 
place adequate collective negotiation procedures, giving an ordinary meaning to 
that expression, within Ryanair. It is to the thorny issue of the “ordinary” meaning 
of collective bargaining I will now turn. 
 
Collective bargaining 
The Labour Court laid down its definition of collective bargaining in the Ashford 
Castle case, noting that the expression is not defined in industrial relations 
legislation and that it is not a legal term of art. Thus, the Labour Court decided 
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that the expression should be assigned the meaning which it would normally bear 
in an industrial relations context:  
 
“Collective bargaining comprehends more than mere negotiation or 
consultation on individual employment related issues including the 
processes of individual grievances in relation to pay or conditions of 
employment. In the industrial relations context in which the term is 
commonly used it connotes a process by which employers or their 
representatives negotiate with representatives of a group or body of 
workers for the purpose of concluding a collective agreement fixing the 
pay and other conditions of employment applicable to the group of 
workers on whose behalf the negotiations are conducted.  
 
Normally the process is characterised by the involvement of a trade union 
representing workers but it may also be conducted by a staff association, 
which is an excepted body within the meaning of the Trade Union Act, 
1941, as amended. However an essential characteristic of collective 
bargaining, properly so called, is that it is conducted between parties of 
equal standing who are independent in the sense that one is not controlled 
by the other.” 
 
The Supreme Court in Ryanair, however, objected to the view “arguably hinted 
at” in the definition that collective bargaining in a non-unionised company must 
take the same form and adopt the same procedures as would apply in collective 
bargaining with a trade union. The court reiterated that if machinery existed in 
Ryanair whereby the pilots had their own independent representatives who sat 
around the table with representatives of Ryanair with a view to reaching 
agreement if possible, that would seem to be collective bargaining within an 
ordinary dictionary meaning. The fact that Ryanair had, from an administrative 
perspective, organised the elections to the ERC, and had a rule against renewal 
of a term for a representative, did not in any way mean that the pilots acting 
through the committee were doing so anything other than independently. As to 
whether the ERCs operated as a potential basis for collective bargaining 
negotiations or not, was really the key issue, and one which the Labour Court 
had failed to determine. 
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The Supreme Court criticised the Labour Court for acknowledging a special trade 
union meaning of the expression “collective bargaining negotiations” and held 
that the phrase should be given simply an ordinary meaning and not any 
distinctive meaning as understood in trade union negotiations. 
 
Excepted bodies 
The final issue I will consider is the company’s contention that the pilots, as a 
category, constituted an “excepted body”. “Excepted body” is defined by s.6(3)(h) 
of the Trade Union Act 1941 (as inserted by s.2 of the Trade Union Act 1942) 
and refers to “a body all the members of which are employed by the same 
employer and which carries on negotiations for the fixing of wages or other 
conditions of employment of its own members (but no other employees)”. In 
Ryanair the Supreme Court decided that if it could be demonstrated that the ERC 
was an instrument in place whereby pilots could enter into collective bargaining 
negotiations with Ryanair, then it would constitute an excepted body. Again, the 
Labour Court had misinterpreted the decision of Fennelly J. in Holbrooke. 
Fennelly J., giving judgment in the Ryanair case, explained that Holbrooke 
applied only to the situation where an employer refuses to negotiate. It was not 
relevant to a situation where a particular category of employees was unwilling to 
avail of internal machinery for negotiation within a non-unionised company where 
the machinery is fair and reasonable and there is no unreasonableness on the 
part of the company. The purpose of the legislation was to deal with a situation 
where both employer and employees in a small firm wanted to negotiate terms 
and conditions in a situation where the employees would not be acting illegally 
for not having a negotiation licence under the 1941 Act. What is required under 
these statutory provisions is simply that the employer has in place an appropriate 
system for such negotiations to take place. 
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Individuals at work? The state of collective 
representation in Irish law 
The Ryanair judgement draws attention to a number of issues that arise in 
relation to the right to bargain legislation, and that derive, in part, from its genesis 
as a compromise position arrived at during social partnership talks. In deciding 
not to go down the route of statutory trade union recognition, but at the same 
time moving away from a purely “voluntarist” approach, the social partners 
agreed on a half-way house solution, which has now been shown to be 
somewhat problematic.  
 
What is collective bargaining? 
As outlined above, the Supreme Court did not endorse the Labour Court’s 
definition of collective bargaining, finding it to be too narrow. A collective 
bargaining unit can, it seems, amount to any group of employees as long as the 
group is recognised for this purpose by the company concerned. The expression 
“collective bargaining” must be given its ordinary meaning, and not any meaning 
particular to trade union negotiations.  
 
However, as has been pointed out by D’Art and Turner, such an approach tends 
to ignore International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions and Declarations 
to which Ireland is a signatory (D’Art and Turner, “Ireland in Breach of ILO 
Conventions on Freedom of Association, Claim Academics” (2006) Industrial 
Relations News 11, p.33). For example, Art.2 of Convention 98 explicitly 
excludes the notion of employer dominated bodies or company unions being 
considered as mechanisms for collective bargaining (ILO Convention No.98 
Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right of Organise and to 
Bargain Collectively). In addition, it seems that dictionary definitions of collective 
bargaining may not throw much light on the matter. The Oxford English 
Dictionary definition is “a mode of fixing the terms of employment by means of 
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bargaining power between an organised body of employees and an employer, or 
association of employers”. The common understanding of the expression is, 
undoubtedly, bound up in its usage with a particular model of industrial relations 
that generally includes trade unions.   
 
Although there is no European Union (EU) definition of collective bargaining, it 
may also be the case that the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Ryanair could be 
contrary to the spirit and objectives of the Treaty of Rome. Article 140 of the EC 
Treaty allows the European Commission to co-ordinate Member State actions in 
relation to the “right of association and collective bargaining between employers 
and workers”. Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that 
“workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance 
with Community law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of 
conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including 
strike action”. It is interesting to note in this context that the Taoiseach was 
embroiled in some controversy in June 2007 about whether Ireland, like the UK, 
had sought to negotiate the right to “opt out” of the charter of fundamental rights 
in the context of the reform treaty negotiated to replace the failed European 
Constitution (Smyth “State Gets Opt-out Clause in EU Rights Charter”, Irish 
Times, June 26, 2007).  
 
Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) must also be considered (see Ewing, “The Implications of 
Wilson and Palmer” (2003) I.L.J. 34, 1). This provides for the right to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of one’s interests. In the Wilson and Palmer case (Wilson & the NUJ, 
Palmer, & Others v The UK [2002] I.R.L.R. 128) the European Court of Human 
Rights held that Art.11 did not include a right to collective bargaining. However, 
the court (laying considerable stress in its ruling on ILO conventions and the EU 
Social Charter) also found that “employees should be free to instruct or permit 
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their union to make representations to their employer or to take action in support 
of their interests” (Para. 46). The court went on to say that if workers were 
prevented from so doing, their freedom to belong to a trade union became 
illusory and that it was the “role of the State to ensure that trade union members 
were not prevented or restrained from using their union to represent them in 
attempts to regulate their relations with their employers” (para.46).  
 
Ultimately, it may be that legislative intervention will be required to give a legal 
definition of collective bargaining. This, logically, would seem to be something 
that could be thrashed out in the social partnership process. Employers groups, 
however, may be quite resistant to such a move, particularly were it to re-balance 
the Supreme Court test in favour of a “trade union” based interpretation of the 
expression.  
 
What would constitute an “Employee Council”? 
The Supreme Court in Ryanair ruled that, where an employer has an internal 
non-union collective bargaining unit in place, this might satisfy the requirements 
of s.2 of the 2004 Act.  The Supreme Court did not, however, set down precise 
rules or offer guidelines for the operation of such a unit. What, then, are the 
minimum requirements for such a body (to which I will refer, for convenience, as 
an “Employee Council”) to be acceptable to the court?  
 
It is clear from the Supreme Court judgment that employers would be free to 
determine the form, structure and organisation of any internal collective 
bargaining units, as long as these have a degree of permanency and are not ad 
hoc. Thus, if an employer were to set up an Employee Council, it could 
presumably decide on issues such as how employees would be elected or 
chosen to be members, the remit of the Council, and the terms of office of its 
members. While the Council would need to operate in a fair and reasonable 
manner, and this would need to involve a clearly defined set of rules and 
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procedures, the nature and extent of these remain in question. A crucial issue 
would be the extent to which the Council would be merely consultative, or 
whether negotiations would need to be with a view to reaching agreement on 
wages and conditions (see below). A further issue would be the extent to which 
the Council could seek independent advice from an “outsider” third party, like a 
trade union.  
 
One possible guide to what such a Council would look like might be derived from 
looking at the Employees (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 2006 
(for a discussion of the main features of the Directive on which the Act is based 
see Hayes, “Informing and Consulting Employees—Irish and EU Developments” 
(2005) 2 (3) I.E.L.J. 89). This requires employers (although only if requested to 
do so by 10 per cent of the workforce) to put in place mechanisms to inform 
employees on a range of issues to do with the recent and probable development 
of the undertaking’s activities and economic situation. Employers are to inform 
and consult with employees, firstly, on the situation, structure and probable 
development of employment within the undertaking and, secondly, on decisions 
likely to lead to substantial changes in work organisation or in contractual 
relations (in the latter case, this is with a view to reaching agreement). The Act 
provides a template of sorts in its “standard fall-back provisions”, which contain 
rules of procedure, rules on the election of employee representatives, rules on 
the structure of any information and consultation body to be set up and rules 
governing complaints and disputes. Section 6 defines “employees’ 
representatives”. They must be employees of the undertaking, elected or 
appointed for the purposes of the Act, and the employer is obliged to arrange for 
the election or appointment of representatives. Indeed, it should be noted that 
where it is the practice of the employer to conduct collective bargaining 
negotiations with a trade union or excepted body that represents 10 per cent or 
more of the employees in the undertaking, the 2006 Act provides that employees 
who are members of that trade union or excepted body are entitled to elect or 
appoint from amongst their members one or more than one employees’ 
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representatives. Thus, if a body like the Employee Council posited here were in 
existence, a certain number of its members would automatically become 
members of any alternative information and consultation forum.  
 
The problem, of course, is that the information and consultation legislation 
reflects and promotes a continental European model of works councils. Works 
councils tend to deal more with information and consultation over qualitative non-
pay issues. It is questionable whether such a body would be the correct 
mechanism to also deal with negotiation (collective bargaining) over quantitative 
pay and conditions. Crucial is the distinction between “consultation” and 
“collective bargaining”. It should be remembered that the European Court of 
Justice (“ECJ”) in Case C–188/03 Wolfgang Kühnel v Junk [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 42 
gave quite an expansive interpretation to what is to be understood as 
“consultation”. The ECJ found that consultation “imposes an obligation to 
negotiate”, thereby driving home the point that consultation “with a view to 
reaching an agreement” envisages compromise and change; employers who 
have a rigid agenda that they want to impose on the workforce without engaging 
in meaningful consultation will be in breach of their obligations (O’ Mara, “Calling 
Time on Collective Dismissals-the Junk Case” (2005) 2 (2) I.E.L.J 68). The ECJ 
stated that: 
 
“[t]he effectiveness of such an obligation (to consult) would be 
compromised if an employer was entitled to terminate contracts of 
employment during the course of the procedure or even at the beginning 
thereof. It would be significantly more difficult for workers' representatives 
to achieve the withdrawal of a decision that has been taken than to secure 
the abandonment of a decision that is being contemplated.” 
 
Is it to be presumed that “collective bargaining” of the type envisaged by the Acts 
amounts to something more than consultation, as defined by the ECJ? If so, a 
question mark arises over whether members of an Employee Council would be 
sufficiently independent from the employer to fulfil such a function. This has been 
already the subject of some debate; the extent to which “excepted bodies” of the 
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type envisaged by the Supreme Court offer employees a sufficient 
counterbalance to employer power, rather than being simply a “creature of the 
employer”. D’Art and Turner (see above) have strongly criticised the Supreme 
Court’s decision as being in breach of ILO Convention 98, which categorises any 
worker’s organisation established under the control and domination of the 
employer as an interference with the right of freedom of association. They argue 
that worker representatives (whether elected or appointed) are employees of the 
undertaking and therefore dependent on the goodwill of management for their 
employment and prospects of promotion. As a result, such representatives 
cannot act with the same independence and freedom as can officials of a trade 
union. They conclude that such a body would be akin to a “company union”. A 
further issue, that they do not address, is the rights and status of such a body (an 
Employee Council). Could it, for example, take industrial action? Would the 
traditional “immunities” conferred on trade unions be available in that event? 
  
Conclusions 
The decision in the Ryanair case has raised considerable challenges for the 
industrial relations actors in the State to meet. The Labour Court will now have to 
re-evaluate its approach to hearing cases and its unique status as an expert 
industrial relations body, with more informal rules of procedure and evidence, has 
been questioned. It may, indeed, require legislative intervention to clarify the 
court’s role.  
 
Whether the Acts will now play much of a role in future disputes is also open to 
question. On one level, the Acts perhaps point to the pitfalls of enacting 
legislation on the basis of social partnership negotiations; the inevitable 
compromises required do not make for sound legislative certainty. More 
seriously, perhaps, the Supreme Court’s view of what constitutes “collective 
bargaining” and what can amount to an employee collective bargaining unit and 
“excepted body” raises concerns about the extent to which the rights of trade 
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unions and the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association are protected. 
These concerns are compounded by several references by the Supreme Court to 
Ryanair’s “right to operate a non-unionised company”. At one point in his 
judgment, Geoghegan J. appears to question the constitutionality of any possible 
legislation on statutory trade union recognition rights, saying that “it is not in 
dispute that as a matter of law Ryanair is perfectly entitled not to deal with trade 
unions nor can a law be passed compelling it to do so”. 
 
If this is the case, it would place Ireland in a unique position within the Anglo-
Saxon industrial relations world. Statutory recognition legislation already exists in 
the United Kingdom, as well as in the United States, where the House of 
Representatives has recently passed the Employee Free Choice Act 2007, which 
will strengthen employee rights to have unions negotiate on their behalf. In 
addition, the Canadian Supreme Court has recently ruled in Health Services and 
Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v British Columbia [2007] S.C.C. 
27 that the collective bargaining rights of workers are protected by the 1982 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and are also a fundamental aspect of Canadian 
society predating the Charter. The Canadian Supreme Court noted that collective 
bargaining complements, promotes and enhances fundamental Charter values 
such as equality and democracy and that the Charter should be presumed to 
provide at least as great a level of protection as is found in the international 
human rights documents that Canada had ratified, including various ILO 
Conventions.  
 
The Labour Court re-hearing of the Ryanair case, if it goes ahead at all, is 
unlikely to be the end of the matter. Whatever way the decision goes, it is likely 
that further challenges to hearings under the Acts will be taken. Ultimately, it may 
well be that a pilots’ dispute over pay and conditions will end up with the precise 
import of the Irish constitutional guarantee of freedom of association being 
determined.  
